The Financing Contract Design of Social Capital Investment in State-owned Enterprises Based on Complementary Efforts
Based on the fact that introducing social capital into state-owned enterprises may lead to bilateral moral hazard in China,we construct equity financing model and convertible bond financing model which complementary efforts and control rights are considered.Through strictly derivation,we find that efforts to complement each other are more conducive to resolving bilateral moral hazard problem than efforts to separate each contractual body in the mixed ownership reforming.Converti-ble bond financing is more conducive to motivating the efforts of each contractual body than common equity financing,and the expected returns of each contractual body is higher,which is a strict Pareto improvement of the former.At the same time,compared with maintaining absolute control by the same investor,the existence of different controllers before and after convertible bond conversion is more conducive to solving the bilateral moral hazard problem in the financing.
complementary effortsbilateral moral hazardequity financingconvertible bond financing
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