Competitive Hierarchical Structure and Innovative Alienation of Grassroots Governance:On the Governance Limits of Competitive Incentives
The innovative behavior of grassroots governments is not only a product of performance compe-tition,but also related to the overall incentive environment in which the bureaucratic structure operates.In the context of national governance transformation,in order to strengthen the promotion of various tasks,competi-tive incentive mechanisms have been widely introduced into the hierarchical system,unexpectedly shaping a u-nique competitive hierarchical structure.The strong competition between vertical departments and the multi-line competition between horizontal governments constitute the core features of this structure.This has led to strong performance competition pressure for various parts of grassroots governments,which is further strength-ened in the interaction of block relationships,forcing them to continuously increase competition intensity,ulti-mately making innovation the main strategy to cope with the flattening effect of competition.However,exces-sive competitive incentives do not conform to the laws of innovation,but instead continuously absorb scarce governance resources at the grassroots level,leading to the proliferation of pseudo innovation and a shift in the focus of grassroots governance.The competitive hierarchical structure constitutes an important incentive model for understanding government behavior and provides the possibility for reflecting on the governance limits of strong incentives.This indicates that releasing incentive intensity to a certain extent will be more conducive to improving governance performance and establishing a reasonable innovation environment.
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