To address the concealed or evaded financial information in the company executives'presentations,financial analysts engage in assertive questioning to elicit executives'responses.The inherent attributes of this interaction,such as institutional contexts and participants'professions,their opposing stances often cause implicit interpersonal conflicts.Based on a dataset of assertive questioning interactions of five listed companies,adopting Rapport Management Theory,this paper examines how financial analysts and company executives mitigate implicit conflicts and achieve rapport management with each other and stock investors as listeners.The study finds that attitude softening,disagreement delaying,obfuscating,and rationalizing are common mitigation strategies employed in such interactions.Through these strategies,financial analysts strengthen their rapport with both company executives and stock investors.In contrast,company executives enhance relational goals and undermine transactional goals simultaneously,thus presenting an ostensible enhancement but actually causing a disruption in their rapport with financial analysts and stock investors.
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万方数据
