A Study on the Impact of Communist Party Organization Embedding on the Performance of State-owned Enterprises:From the Perspective of Executive Excessive Power Restrictions and Inefficient Investment Suppression
From the perspective of grassroots party organization construction in state-owned enterprises,taking China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned enterprises from 2013 to 2022 as research samples,this paper examines the impact of party organi-zation embedding on the performance of state-owned enterprises and the mediating role of executive excess power restrictions and ineffi-cient investment suppression.The results show that the embedding of party organizations in the governance structure can significantly improve the performance of state-owned enterprises,and the improvement effect on the performance of state-owned enterprises is differ-ent among the board of directors,the board of supervisors and the Executive level.Embedding party organizations into the board of di-rectors has the greatest effect on improving the performance of state-owned enterprises,followed by the executive board,and finally the board of supervisors.Mechanism analysis indicates that party organization embedding improves the performance of state-owned enterpri-ses by restricting executive excessive power and curbing inefficient investment behavior.Heterogeneous analysis manifests that com-pared with central enterprises,monopolistic state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises with good internal control quality,party organization embedding has a more significant effect on improving the performance of local state-owned enterprises,competitive state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises with poor internal control quality.The conclusions not only help us deeply understand the economic consequences of party organizations'participation in state-owned enterprise governance,but also provide new ideas for the government to continue to improve the modern enterprise system with China characteristics.
Party Organizations Participate in GovernanceExcessive Power RestrictionInefficient InvestmentPerformance of Enter-prises
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