首页|纵向监管、地方选择性供地与产业结构绿色转型

纵向监管、地方选择性供地与产业结构绿色转型

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地方政府的有效执行是中国式分权下提升中央发展战略实施绩效的关键,而中央政府对地方政府治理行为的有效监督则是其中至关重要的环节.本文基于2007-2019年中国微观工业用地供应以及中央环保督察的通报结果数据,采用广义双重差分法实证考察中央环保督察对地方政府选择性供地策略的影响及其机制.研究表明,中央环保督察促使地方政府降低污染密集型工业用地供应,增加清洁型工业用地供应,从而推动地区产业结构的绿色转型.机制分析发现,中央环保督察通过地方领导人职业发展激励机制以及产业转型能力机制对不同特征的城市工业土地供应结构策略产生异质性影响.本文结论对高质量发展背景下的央地互动关系与地方利用土地偏向性供给推动产业结构绿色转型具有政策启示.
Vertical Supervision,Local Selective Land Supply and Industrial Structure Green Transformation
The effective execution by the local government is the key to improve the implementation performance of the central government's development strategy,and effective supervision by the central government is a crucial link.The central inspection of environmental protection is a major institutional innovation of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council to promote the construction of ecological civilization and environmental protection work,marking the trend of China's ecological environment supervision system towards the same responsibility of the Party and the government,and it has become a normal regulatory tool for the central government to urge local environmental protection responsibilities.This paper fully investigates the direct role of local government behavior in the impact of the central inspection of environmental protection,as well as the impact of environmental regulation on the incremental behavior of new enterprises or local land supply strategy.From the perspective of local government behavior strategies,this paper empirically examines the influence of central environmental protection inspection,a vertical supervision behavior,on the selective land supply strategy of local government and its mechanism.This paper manually compiles the unique textual data of the notification results of the central inspection of environmental protection,as well as the city panel data of urban land supply by industry,to measure the differences in the degree of policy impact and industrial structure transformation among different cities.The generalized difference-in-differences method is used to estimate the causal effect of the central inspection on local government's selective land supply strategy.This not only effectively corrects the measurement bias and endogeneity issues,but also estimates the marginal effects of the central environmental inspection on local selective land supply strategy.The research indicates that the central inspection of environmental protection will urge local governments to reduce the supply of pollution-intensive industrial land and increase the supply of clean industrial land,thus promoting the green transformation of regional industrial structure.Mechanism analysis shows that the central inspection of environmental protection have a heterogeneous impact on urban industrial land supply strategy through the career development incentive mechanism of local leaders and the industrial transformation capability mechanism.That is,when local officials are faced with strong promotion incentives,central environmental protection inspectors can significantly reduce the supply of pollution-intensive industrial land by local governments.The stronger the local industrial transformation capability,the stronger the motivation of the government to promote the green transformation of industrial structure.The conclusion provides the following policy implications.With the commitment of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality and high-quality economic development by the Chinese government,it is necessary to seize the opportunity of the driving role of environmental protection supervision on industrial structure upgrading,make good use of the policy tool of biased land supply,coordinate industrial policy and environmental policy and formulate local policies for cities at different stages of development to more effectively promote the green transformation of industrial structure.

central inspections of environmental protectionlocal selective land supplyindustrial green transformationcentral-local relation

周玉龙、刘玉海、宋悦

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南开大学经济与社会发展研究院

南开大学经济行为与政策模拟实验室 300071

中央环保督察 地方选择性供地 产业结构绿色转型 纵向监管

天津市哲学社会科学规划一般项目南开大学亚洲研究中心项目南开大学亚洲研究中心项目南开大学文科发展基金教育部哲学社会科学实验室专项

TJYJ22-005AS2314AS2303ZB22BZ0322H0122711

2024

经济理论与经济管理
中国人民大学

经济理论与经济管理

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子：1.858
ISSN：1000-596X
年,卷(期)：2024.44(2)
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