Shareholding Cooperative Reform and the Governance Performance of Rural Collective-operated Assets
In China,rural collective-operated assets are one of the most crucial capitals that contribute to the prosperity of the collective economy.However,due to the dissolution of People's Commune,the tangible organizations that used to govern collective ownership no longer exist.Although the nominal ownership of these assets belongs to the collective,a large majority of the collective members do not benefit from them.To address the issue mentioned above,China launched the shareholding cooperative reform for collective-operated assets at the end of 2016.This reform aims to promote co-construction,co-governance and co-sharing of collective-operated assets,and make property rights of these assets clearer,thereby enhancing the efficiency of assets'allocation and ensuring fair distribution of assets'benefits among the collective members.Therefore,does the effect of this reform align with the expectations?Using four-period data of 381 rural collective-operated assets from Henan province and the method of staggered difference-in-differences,this paper tries to address the above question by examining the effect of shareholding cooperative reform on governance performance from the perspectives of fairness and efficiency.We come to the following conclusions.First,the shareholding cooperative reform can promote the fair sharing of rural collective-operated assets by reducing illegal occupation and unfair distribution.Second,the shareholding cooperative reform can improve the operational efficiency of rural collective-operated assets by reducing the operational cost.Third,the shareholding cooperative reform does not lead to an appreciation in assets in the short term.Fourth,the effect of shareholding cooperative reform on governance performance is heterogeneous depending on the pilot type,the asset type,the rural type,the form of shares setting,the form of shares management,the structure of collective organization and the principle of voting process.This paper has the following contributions.First,by employing staggered difference-in-differences,this paper provides supplementary insights into the causal inference research regarding the effects of the shareholding cooperative reform.Second,this paper analyzes the heterogeneity of the effects of the shareholding cooperative reform in different contexts.By doing so,we have uncovered both positive experiences and inappropriate practices during the reform process.