Competitive Effects of Data Portability Policy on Digital Platforms
In order to solve the increasing data monopoly problem in digital platforms,data portability policy has become an important anti-monopoly regulatory policy,but the existing theoretical research has not given a clear answer to the competitive effects of data portability policy.This paper analyzes the competitive effects of data portability policy by constructing an incumbent-entrant dynamic game model.The results show that data portability policy can generally reduce the switching costs of consumers,weaken the market power formed by the incumbent platform through data advantages,promote market competition and improve the total welfare of consumers and the total welfare of society.However,the competition-promoting effect of data porta-bility policy is obviously different in different scenarios.When consumers face the switching cost of internet at-tention,it has an obvious competition-promoting effect.In the case that consumers also face personalized serv-ice switching costs,data portability policy can alleviate competition distortion to a certain extent,but can not fundamentally change the monopoly trend of incumbent platforms.In general,data portability policy is a viable policy option to solve data monopoly,but the implementation of the policy should be accurately designed ac-cording to different scenarios to ensure that the goal of maintaining a competitive market is achieved.
digital platformdata monopolyswitching costdata portability policyanti-monopoly
万方数据
维普
