Refusing for Accepting:Research on B2C Platform's Cooperative Strategies for Flow Attraction Based on Dynamic Games
In the current situation where the main flow channels have been occupied by a few head en-trance companies and the start-up B2C platforms generally lack sufficient funds,the cooperation in attracting flow is very important to the platforms.Embedding independent attraction and limited price strategies into the process of bilateral cooperation negotiation as the non-cooperative strategies of the platform and flow entrance,the cooperative flow attraction strategies of the platform is studied,which mainly answers the question of how to improve its cooperative negotiating position from the perspective of dynamic game.We establish a multistage dynamic game model for platform and flow entrance,which are considered as the supplier and the demander of flow respectively,based on a dynamic two-sided network externality growth model.The model distinguishes the negotiation process of cooperation into different stages:Non-cooperation and cooperation.The following conclu-sions are obtained by the every stage equilibrium:(1)Under the condition that the price of the entrance is not limited,the platform can increase the final profit distribution by independently attracting a portion of the flow(or not independently attracting any flow)before cooperation when the marginal cost of independent attraction is lower(or higher)than a certain threshold;(2)Under the condition that the entrance limits its price,the optimal choice for the platform is not to attract flow independently.However,when the platform's marginal cost is below a certain threshold,the entrance will reduce its price-limited level,which can enable the platform to obtain a higher profit allocation in the cooperation;(3)The entrance will use a limited price as a dominant strategy.However,this promise is not reliable and there is always an incentive for entrance to raise or lower the limited price after the platform has made its strategic choice.
platformflow entranceflow attractioncooperation negotiation"non-cooperative-cooper-ative"dynamic game
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