Research on the Productivity Effect of Local Government Competition——Theoretical Mechanism and Empirical Evidence
The competition between local governments is supported by various policy tools.As the relationship between the central and local governments changes and the degree of fiscal expenditure decentralization changes,the intervention strategies of local governments towards enterprises will change,resulting in significant productivity effects for enterprises.This article takes the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as a sample to study the impact of local government competition on total factor productivity of enterprises.Based on this,it examines the moderating effect of fiscal and political incentives received by local governments.Research finds that the competition between local governments'fiscal expenditures significantly affects the total factor productivity of enterprises,but the two forms of fiscal expenditures,namely fiscal subsidies and tax incentives,have opposite productivity effects.The increase in the degree of fiscal expenditure decentralization not only weakens the promoting effect of fiscal subsidies on total factor productivity,but also enhances the inhibitory effect of tax incentives on total factor productivity.The shift in the direction of central performance evaluation from"growth rate"to"development quality"will further exacerbate the negative regulatory effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization on the productivity effect of local government competition.Therefore,it is necessary to actively promote the readjustment of the relationship between central and local financial powers,and improve the financial and political incentives for local governments to promote the improvement of total factor productivity.
local government competitiontotal factor productivityfiscal expenditure decentralizationadjustment of performance appraisal
万方数据
维普
