中央银行政策调控的目标优化与权重管理——兼论实体经济波动与政策信誉的重要性
Target Optimization and Weight Management of Central Bank's Policy Adjustment——Discussion on the Importance of Real Economic Fluctuations and Policy Reputation
田方钰 1刘达禹1
作者信息
- 1. 吉林大学商学与管理学院,长春130012
- 折叠
摘要
实体经济波动与政策信誉均是中央银行关注的重要目标.面对当下需求收缩、供给冲击和预期转弱的"三重压力",中央银行如何在实体经济目标与政策信誉间分配权重成为了亟待阐释的问题.研究发现:中央银行的名义利率调整主要是盯住剔除食品价格的CPIf和伪产出缺口,而不是盯住产出缺口等现实中不存在的变量;对于通货膨胀而言,中央银行具有明显的区间调控意愿,即只要通胀偏离不超出一定范围,政策利率一般不随之变动,至于产出端,中央银行的容忍度则相对较低,通常会采取即时调控,并具有强烈的规避经济收缩意愿;相对于政策信誉成本,实体经济波动成本仍是货币政策成本的核心来源.据此,货币政策调控应赋于实体经济更高的权重,提高中央银行政策调控效能,深化利率市场化改革.
Abstract
Real economic fluctuations and policy reputation are both important targets for the central bank.Facing with the triple pressures of demand contraction,supply shock and weakening expectations,how does the central bank assign weights between the target of real economy and policy reputation has become an urgent issue to explain.The conclusions are as follows:the central bank's nominal interest rate adjustment mainly targets CPIf excluding food prices and pseudo output gap,rather than the output gap and other economic variables that do not exist in reality;for inflation,the central bank has an obvious preference for range-based regulation,while for the output,it owns a relatively low tolerance,and will basically adopt immediate regulation with a strong willingness to avoid economic contraction;comparing to policy reputation cost,the cost of real economic fluctuations are still the core parts.In conclusion,monetary policy should pay higher weight to the real economic fluctuations,improve the efficiency of central bank policy management,and keep carrying forward the interest rate liberalization reform.
关键词
货币政策目标/货币调控偏好/福利损失成本/政策权重分配Key words
monetary policy target/monetary adjustment preference/welfare loss cost/policy weights assignment引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA042)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2022-JCXK-36)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据