Internal Cooperation Coordination and External Subsidy Mechanisms in Low-carbon Cooperative Supply Chains
In the pursuit of dual-carbon goals of carbon dioxide peaking and carbon neutrality,enterprises emerge as the principal entities responsible for carbon reduction.The onus for emission reduction has thus extended across the entire supply chain,fostering the development of low-carbon cooperative supply chains(LC-CSCs).However,several factors,such as moral hazard,information asymmetry,and market externalities,hinder the effective implementation of coopera-tive emission reduction with in these chains.Addressing the following issues is critical:How do factors such as cost syn-ergies among LC-CSC members,along with product and carbon markets,influence emission reduction decisions?How can LC-CSC members be effectively coordinated to collaborate on emission reduction?What external subsidy mecha-nisms should the government design to incentivize LC-CSC members'emission reduction behaviors?To address the aforementioned issues,this paper integrates the perspectives of internal cooperation coordination and external subsidy incentives within the low-carbon supply chain,taking into account information asymmetry and carbon emission externalities.It constructs and analyzes the equilibrium strategies and influencing factors of a bilateral moral hazard model for LC-CSCs,deriving the optimal"cooperation coordination contract"within LC-CSCs.In response to market failures,two governmental subsidy incentive mechanisms-pre-subsidy and post-subsidy-are designed,with spe-cific scenarios provided for each,thereby optimizing the external"subsidy incentive mechanism"for LC-CSCs.The pa-per also validates the model's effectiveness through numerical analysis using data from pilot carbon trading cities in China.The study elucidates that cost synergies,carbon pricing,and consumers'preferences for low-carbon options substan-tially motivate LC-CSC members to reduce emissions.However,"opportunistic behaviors"induced by moral hazard among members can undermine these efforts.In such scenarios,implementing a"cooperation coordination contract"proves to be equitable and effective in cultivating cooperative relationships among LC-CSC members.Furthermore,"mar-ket failure"caused by the positive externalities of emission reduction may result in insufficient efforts by LC-CSC mem-bers to reduce carbon emissions,necessitating the timely introduction of government"subsidy incentive mechanisms"for compensation.Specifically,a pre-subsidy strategy is advisable when the public infrastructure for emission reduction is relatively complete;otherwise,a post-subsidy strategy better enhances social welfare.This paper contributes to the scholarly investigation of internal coordination and external incentives for LC-CSCs in three key aspects.Firstly,addressing scenarios characterized by moral hazard alongside cost synergies and information asymmetry,this model intricately examines the challenges of mitigating moral hazard within the framework of cost synergies and informa-tion asymmetry.Departing from conventional methodologies that merely aggregate members'emission reduction costs,the study highlights the cost synergies,whereby heightened emission reduction efforts by one party alleviate the reduction costs of others.This elucidates the nuanced decision-making dynamics among supply chain members under the combined influence of information asymmetry and cost synergies.Secondly,to cultivate emission reduction behavior within LC-CSCs,a coordinative incentive mechanism is devised,emphasizing internal coordination and external incentives.The research advocates for an approach that integrates internal coordination contracts with external subsidy incentive mechanisms.This holistic strategy aims to alleviate moral hazard and address market failure stemming from information asymmetry,thereby fostering micro-level cooperation coordina-tion and optimizing macro-level social welfare.Thirdly,from the perspective of the government,pre-subsidy and post-subsidy mechanisms targeting LC-CSC car-bon emission reduction have been designed,with the applicable conditions of both subsidy mechanisms clearly delin-eated.In comparison to traditional price subsidies or carbon quota subsidies,this paper proposes pre-subsidy strategies in-volving enhancing public infrastructure and post-subsidy strategies based on the proportion of enterprise emission reduc-tion benefits.This offers theoretical support for the governmental formulation of rational carbon emission reduction sub-sidy policies,thus expanding the theoretical framework for the design of such policies.
Low-carbon Cooperative Supply ChainsCost SynergyBilateral Moral HazardCoordination ContractSub-sidy Incentive
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