首页|不同碳配额分配机制下考虑低碳偏好的寡头企业价格决策分析

不同碳配额分配机制下考虑低碳偏好的寡头企业价格决策分析

扫码查看
本文基于不同碳配额分配机制考虑低碳偏好的寡头企业决策,建立双寡头企业碳减排策略和市场竞争的动态模型,讨论博弈模型中纳什均衡解的稳定性及企业的价格调整速度、竞争水平和碳减排投入对价格与利润的影响机制.研究结果表明,基准法中当各种因素发生变化时企业获得的利润大于祖父法且对市场竞争更具稳定性;处于领导地位的企业对市场影响力大需谨慎决策;消费者低碳偏好对企业利润贡献相同,有助于规模较小企业发展;企业碳减排投入增加时,竞争对手的利润没有受到太大影响,但可能为其带来独特优势.本文研究结果不仅在理论上丰富了企业竞争行为和碳减排策略的研究领域,还为政府在制定碳配额机制时提供了有益的参考.
The Price Decision Analysis of Oligopolistic Firms Considering Low-Carbon Preferences Under Different Carbon Quota Allocation Mechanisms
Based on the decision-making of oligopolistic firms considering low-carbon prefer-ences under different carbon quota allocation mechanisms,a dynamic model of carbon emission reduction strategies and market competition of duo-oligopolistic firms is established to discuss the stability of the Nash equilibrium solution in the game model as well as the influence mechanisms of firms'price adjustment speeds,competition levels,and carbon emission reduction inputs on prices and profits.The results of the paper show that the profits obtained by firms in the bench-mark method are greater than those in the grandfather method when various factors change,and are more stable to the market competition;firms in the leading position have a great influence on the market and need to be careful in their decision-making;consumers'low-carbon preference contributes to the profits of firms in the same way,which is helpful to the development of small-scale firms;and the profits of competitors are not greatly affected by the increase in carbon emission reduction inputs of firms,but it may bring a unique advantage for them.The findings not only theoretically enrich the research field of firms'competitive behavior and carbon emission reduction strategies,but also provide useful references for the government in formulating the car-bon quota allocation mechanism.

carbon quotaslow-carbon preferencedynamic game

阿布都热合曼·卡的尔、杨景涵、雷明

展开 >

新疆财经大学

北京大学乡村振兴研究院

北京大学光华管理学院

英国爱丁堡大学

展开 >

碳配额 低碳偏好 动态博弈

农业农村部农业生态与资源保护总站项目

2024

经济研究参考
经济科学出版社

经济研究参考

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.53
ISSN:2095-3151
年,卷(期):2024.(1)
  • 20