Research on the Encroachment Behavior of Controllers of Listed Companies——Based on the Perspective of Separation of Control Rights and Cash Flow Rights
Due to the stock value of listed companies is closely related to corporate governance,good corporate governance has a significant effect on corporate value and excessive embezzlement of control people can reduce the value of the corporate.This paper will be based on the microscopic perspective and make the governance of listed companies as a target.Through the establishment of dual shareholding structure model,pyramid shareholding structure model and cross-shareholding structure model,this paper will analysis the right of distribution between cash flow right and control right in the corporate governance performance.The study found that state-owned enterprise has more control of the amplification coefficient than the private enterprise.The separation of cash flow rights and control will increase the control of embezzlement,excessive investment behavior in state-owned enterprise.At present,in the market of listed company still has a marginal increasing rapidly occupation expectation.In order to reduce excessive occupation behavior,protect the interest of shareholder and maintain the valve of corporate,this paper suggest that through improving the internal governance mechanism and increasing external supervision cost,the allocation efficiency of listed companies will significantly be enhanced.
cash flow rightscontrolCorporate governanceencroach on earnings
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