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分析师跟踪能否抑制企业杠杆操纵

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杠杆操纵可能会阻碍企业可持续发展.文章以企业杠杆操纵为研究视角,运用混合最小二乘模型,通过2013-2022年A股上市企业数据研究探讨分析师跟踪对企业杠杆操纵的影响.研究发现:分析师跟踪对企业杠杆操纵起到显著的抑制作用,通过一系列稳健性检验后结论依然成立.传导机制表明,分析师跟踪通过抑制企业代理成本、缓解融资约束和提高企业内部控制水平来抑制企业杠杆操纵.异质性分析表明,分析师跟踪背景下,在信息透明度低和投资者保护指数低的样本中起到更为显著的效果.研究结论丰富了分析师跟踪效应的相关研究,同时也为抑制企业杠杆操纵提供了新的思路.
Can Analyst Tracking Suppress Corporate Leverage Manipulation
Leveraged manipulation may hinder the sustainable development of enterprises.The article takes corporate leverage manipulation as the research perspective and uses a mixed least squares model to explore the impact of analyst tracking on corporate leverage manipulation through data analysis of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022.Research has found that analyst tracking has a significant inhibitory effect on corporate leverage manipulation,and the conclusion remains valid after a series of robustness tests;The transmission mechanism indicates that analyst tracking suppresses corporate leverage manipulation by suppressing agency costs,alleviating financing constraints,and improving internal control levels;Heterogeneity analysis shows that under the background of analyst tracking,it plays a more significant role in samples with low information transparency and low investor protection index.The research findings enrich the relevant research on analyst tracking effects,and also provide new ideas for suppressing corporate leverage manipulation.

analyst trackingleveraged operationagency costsfinancing constraintsinternal control levels

张哲源

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湖南工业大学经济与贸易学院,湖南株洲 412007

分析师跟踪 杠杆操纵 代理成本 融资约束 内部控制

2024

吉林金融研究
中国人民银行长春中心支行

吉林金融研究

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.418
ISSN:1009-3109
年,卷(期):2024.(2)
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