高管过度自信、分析师关注与企业金融化
Top Executives'Overconfidence,Analyst Coverage and Enterprise Financialization
代澎瑞 1邹能锋1
作者信息
- 1. 安徽农业大学经济管理学院,安徽合肥 230036
- 折叠
摘要
基于企业发展呈现"脱实向虚"现象的背景下,从企业高管的角度出发,以 2011～2021 年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,研究高管过度自信与企业金融化之间的关系,并探究分析师关注这一外部监督机制对两者关系的调节效应.研究结果表明,高管过度自信正向影响企业金融化水平,过度自信的高管更倾向于配置较多的金融资产.在分析师的外部关注与监督下,高管过度自信引发的企业金融化能够在一定程度上得到缓解.进一步传导路径分析表明,企业风险承担水平在高管过度自信与企业金融化的关系中起到了中介作用,过度自信的高管具有的风险偏好性是导致其配置过多金融资产的原因之一.
Abstract
Based on the background that the development of enterprises presents the phenomenon of"disenchantment from re-ality",starting from the perspective of enterprise executives and taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as re-search sample,we test the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and explore the moderating effect of analyst coverage,an external monitoring,on the relationship between them.The results show that top execu-tives'overconfidence has a positive impact on enterprise financialization,and overconfident executives are more inclined to allo-cate more financial assets.With external coverage and supervision by analysts,enterprise financialization triggered by executive overconfidence can be mitigated to a certain extent.Further transmission path analysis shows that the level of corporate risk-taking mediates the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and that the risk-averse of top executives'overconfidence is one of the reasons for their excessive allocation to financial assets.
关键词
高管过度自信/分析师关注/企业金融化Key words
top executives'overconfidence/analyst coverage/enterprise financialization引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
维普
万方数据