Top Executives'Overconfidence,Analyst Coverage and Enterprise Financialization
Based on the background that the development of enterprises presents the phenomenon of"disenchantment from re-ality",starting from the perspective of enterprise executives and taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as re-search sample,we test the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and explore the moderating effect of analyst coverage,an external monitoring,on the relationship between them.The results show that top execu-tives'overconfidence has a positive impact on enterprise financialization,and overconfident executives are more inclined to allo-cate more financial assets.With external coverage and supervision by analysts,enterprise financialization triggered by executive overconfidence can be mitigated to a certain extent.Further transmission path analysis shows that the level of corporate risk-taking mediates the relationship between top executives'overconfidence and enterprise financialization,and that the risk-averse of top executives'overconfidence is one of the reasons for their excessive allocation to financial assets.
top executives'overconfidenceanalyst coverageenterprise financialization
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
维普
