首页|含储能参与的日前市场价值公平分配机制

含储能参与的日前市场价值公平分配机制

扫码查看
原文链接
  • 万方数据
  • 维普
现有的节点边际电价机制中,由于传统发电商具有市场操控力,当储能独立参与市场出清时,各发电商采取策略性报价,打压并挤占储能电站的市场份额,阻碍了储能电站参与市场出清,间接导致市场出清总成本增大.为此,文中提出一种包含传统机组以及储能电站参与的市场竞争机制.首先,分析现有市场结算机制的弊端以及阻碍储能参与市场出清的原因;其次,建立含储能参与的市场出清模型,采用样本均值近似法求解二阶段随机规划模型;然后,基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)结算机制,提出适应储能参与的日前市场价值分配机制;最后,提出解决激励相容而造成的系统收支不平衡问题的策略.文中采用IEEE 30 节点系统为例,证明该机制满足激励相容、收支平衡以及削弱传统发电商的市场操控力等要求,同时储能的参与将会减小系统出清总成本,降低市场价格剧烈波动的风险.
Mechanism for fair distribution of day-ahead market value with energy storage participation
In the existing locational marginal price mechanism,conventional generators have market manipulation power.When independently participating electricity market,the market share of energy storage plants can be suppressed and squeezed by each generator by taking strategic offers.Energy storage plants are prevented from participating in market clearing by traditional generators,and the total cost of indirect market clearing is caused to increase.To this end,a market competition mechanism is proposed in the paper that includes the participation of traditional units and energy storage power plants.Firstly,the drawbacks of the existing market settlement mechanism and the reasons hindering the participation of energy storage in market clearing are analyzed.Secondly,a market clearing model with energy storage participation is established,and a two-stage stochastic planning model is solved by using the sample mean approximation.Then,a day-ahead market value allocation mechanism adapted to the participation of energy storage is proposed based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)settlement mechanism.Finally,a strategy to address the system issue imbalance of payments and revenues caused by incentive compatibility is proposed.The IEEE 30-node system is used in the paper.It is demonstrated that the mechanism satisfies the properties of incentive compatibility,imbalance of payments and revenues and weakening of the market manipulation power of conventional generators.The total cost of clearing the system is reduced and the risk is lowered in the face of sharp market price fluctuations.

electricity marketlocational marginal priceincentive compatibilityVickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)settlement mechanismstochastic planningimbalance of payments and revenues

舒征宇、王喜召、董超、王灿、邵浩然

展开 >

三峡大学电气与新能源学院,湖北 宜昌 443000

南方电网调峰调频发电有限公司(广东)储能材料有限公司,广东 广州 510630

梯级水电站运行与控制湖北省重点实验室,湖北 宜昌 443000

电力市场 节点边际电价 激励相容 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)结算机制 随机规划 收支不平衡

国家自然科学基金

52107108

2024

10.12158/j.2096-3203.2024.02.024

电力工程技术
江苏省电力公司 江苏省电机工程学会

电力工程技术

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子：0.969
ISSN：2096-3203
年,卷(期)：2024.43(2)
  • 27