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双渠道下基于在线旅行商拍卖销售的酒店定价决策

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在酒店与在线旅行商(OTA)组成的旅游供应链系统中,考虑OTA对客房采用拍卖销售的情况下,构建了酒店与OTA的集中式决策和以酒店为主导、OTA为追随者的分散式决策,并采用逆向归纳法给出了酒店与OTA的最优定价决策,研究结果表明,OTA的拍卖数量会随着销售价格和佣金的增加而增加;最优佣金与最优拍卖数量会随着OTA平台用户基础数量和拍卖时长的增加而增加;相比分散式决策,集中式决策下旅游供应链系统有更多的客房拍卖数量和更高的销售单价.基于此,酒店与OTA应以利益共同体的理念开展合作,实现整体利益最大化,促进双方高质量发展.
Hotel Pricing Decision in Online Travel Agent Auction Sales Through Dual Channels
Absrtact:In the tourism supply chain system composed of hotel and online travel agent(OTA),for OTA hotel room auction sales,a centralized decision-making model for the hotel and the OTA and a decentral-ized decision-making model with hotel as the leading and OTA as the follower were constructed,and the optimal decision-making for the hotel and the OTA was given by Backward induction analysis.The re-sults of the study show that the number of hotel rooms sold by the OTA is affected by both price and commission.The increase of sales price and commission will increase the number of the OTA aution.The optimal commission and the optimal auction quantity will increase with the number of OTA users and the auction duration.Compared with decentralized decision-making,centralized decision-making tourism supply chain system has greater room auction quantity and higher sales price.On this basis,the hotel and the OTA should cooperate with the concept of community of interest to maximize the overall benefits and promote the high-quality development of both sides.

dual channelsonline travel agentauctionhotel pricingStackelberg game

徐磊、蔡建刚

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吉首大学旅游学院,湖南张家界 427000

双渠道 在线旅行商 拍卖 酒店定价 Stackelberg博弈

2024

吉首大学学报(自然科学版)
吉首大学

吉首大学学报(自然科学版)

影响因子:0.451
ISSN:1007-2985
年,卷(期):2024.45(3)