Research on Stability Analysis and Optimization of Supervision Mechanism of E-Commerce Platform Supervision System
In recent years,while E-commerce has been driving China's economic growth and fostering strategic new industries,various speculative behaviours and inefficient market regulation have emerged as governance challen-ges.This paper explores the path to optimise the regulatory mechanism for the stable and healthy development of the E-commerce platform market by constructing an evolutionary game system dynamics model.The study finds that:the speculative behaviour of any regulated entity in the E-commerce platform market will bring about fluctuations and shocks in the whole system;the increase in penalties cannot curb the profit motive of the regulated entity itself,and the increase in reputation loss can effectively curb the fluctuations of the regulatory system in the long term,but has little effect in the short term;the dynamic penalty model can effectively curb the self-interest behaviour of the platform and sellers in the short term,and can maintain the stability of the system in the long term.The dynamic pen-alty model can effectively curb the self-interested behaviour of platforms and sellers in the short term and maintain the stability of the system in the long term.Therefore,the design of the regulatory mechanism for E-commerce plat-forms needs to dynamically adjust the value of penalties according to the rate of violations by the regulated parties,while focusing on the long-term mechanism of consumer reputation evaluation.
E-commerce platform market regulation systemEvolutionary gameSystem dynamicsStabilityOpti-mization of supervision mechanism
万方数据
维普
