Analysis of Three-Way Evolutionary Game in the Initial Stage of Environmental Mass Incidents
At present,China's economy is in a period of rapid development,the public's awareness of environmental protection is increasing,and mass incidents caused by environmental pollution are growing"blowout".Public participation in decision-making at an early stage of an incident can effectively prevent conflict.To improve public participation in the decision-making stage of NIMBY projects,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to ex-plore the impact of different interest demands on tripartite strategic choices by taking three main stakeholders:local governments,investment enterprises and the surrounding public in the early stage of environmental mass incidents.The results show that the subjects of all interests can actively resolve conflicts and reduce the occurrence of mass en-vironmental incidents under the basic principle of"government leadership,enterprise responsibility,and people's sup-port"under the basic principle of"government leadership,enterprise responsibility,and people's support".
Evolutionary gameEnvironmental group eventsSimulation analysis
万方数据
维普
