With the development of intelligent and automated safety critical systems,the scale and complexity of these systems have increased significantly.Traditional security analysis methods based on chain/tree safety causal models have major limitations in terms of their ability to analyze nonlinear and non-failure hazardous factors.Although modern safety causal models based on system theory have been effectively validated in multiple fields such as aerospace and nuclear energy,these methods currently lack strict and unified analytical steps and automated analytical tools.Accordingly,this study proposes a modeling tool for complex system control processes called Control Logic Petri Net(CLPN)to formalize the activities and their interactive relationships in the control process and to extend the reachability graph of the CLPN model.To the greatest extent possible,the latter prevents analysis model increase caused by failure event modeling without affecting security analysis.Based on the CLPN model and using the System Theory Accident Model and Process(STAMP)system safety causal model as the standard for hazard factor classification,the study then explores hazard control activities,which serve as system hazards based on accessibility analysis,and achieves automated analysis of system safety.Finally,the study employs case analysis and method comparison to verify the usability and effectiveness of the proposed method.Experimental results show that the proposed system security analysis method based on CLPN has significant advantages in terms of the completeness of the results and analysis efficiency.
Petri netsystem securitysecurity analysisSystem Theory Accident Model and Process(STAMP)Control Logic Petri Net(CLPN)
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