Screening models of dual-channel supply chain under demand information asymmetry
An increasing number of manufacturers actively acquire demand information through various ways like market investigation.Specially,in a dual-channel supply chain,manufacturers sell products directly to consumers through their own channels,then they possess a large amount of sales data,which can support their demand predic-tion.By considering the situation that the manufacturer possessed private demand information,a dual-channel sup-ply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer was constructed.The information screening models were developed based on the two-part tariff contract and the quality encouragement contract,and the optimal contract design scheme was derived to realize demand information sharing in the dual-channel supply chain.By comparing the members'e-quilibrium solutions and ex-ante expected profits,the validity of two contracts was analyzed,and the impact of de-mand information asymmetry on the supply chain was discussed.The result showed that,compared with the infor-mation symmetry,it was not conducive to the improvement of product quality when the manufacturer possessed pri-vate demand information.However,under demand information asymmetry,the wholesale price was lowered.In general,the manufacturer could obtain information rent besides the reserved profit by possessing private demand in-formation.Under specific conditions,the retailer could also acquire more ex-ante expected profit under information asymmetry than that under information symmetry.Therefore,it was possible for the dual-channel supply chain to perform better under demand information asymmetry.
demand information asymmetrydual-channel supply chaininformation screeningproduct quality
万方数据
维普
