Stability of government regulation and enterprise cooperative distribution strategy under environmental regulation
Government and enterprise alliance are the main participants in collaborative distribution of low carbon e-mission reduction.It is of great significance to study the interest relationship between government and enterprise for promoting emission reduction.Under the background of environmental regulation policy in China,the evolution process of government regulation decision on cooperative distribution of enterprise alliance was discussed by evolu-tionary game theory,and an evolutionary game model of government regulation and enterprise cooperative distribu-tion strategy was established.By simulating the dynamic evolution process of the alliance between government and enterprises,four stable equilibrium strategies were obtained.The results showed that the larger the proportion of in-itial government supervision was,the faster the alliance tends to be stable.The government should improve the reg-ulatory willingness,set environmental tax rates higher than the threshold value,and guide enterprises to cooperate in low-carbon distribution,so as to achieve the goal of low-carbon emission reduction.
万方数据
维普
