Collection mode selection equilibrium for competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal power
For two competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal market power,in which both manufacturers of two chains can choose one of three modes:manufacturer-collection(M Mode),retailer-collection(R Mode)and third-party-collection(T Mode).The game models were established and solved to obtain the equilibrium solutions,members'profits and chains'profits under nine possible collection combinations.Based on comparisons of different combinations,the equilibrium strategies of two chains'collection mode selection game were derived.Finally,the Pareto efficiencies of equilibrium combinations were analyzed.The conclusions showed that:①there existed the phenomenon of"second-mover advantage"in leader-follower chain games,particularly when the collection efficiency of the collection party in the follower chain was not inferior to the leader chain,the performance indexes of the follo-wer chain were completely superior to those of the leader chain;②when the collection mode of the follower chain was given arbitrarily,regardless of the competition intensity of two chains,the leader chain's manufacturer choo-sing R mode was best for itself,retailer and the whole chain;when the collection mode of the leader chain was giv-en,R mode,M mode and T mode would become the best choice for the follower chain's manufacturer and the whole follower chain as the competition between two chains intensifies;③RR,RM and RT might be equilibrium combina-tions of two chains'collection mode selection game,but RR and RM might fall into inefficient prisoner's dilemma under certain conditions.
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