首页|企业纳税遵从、CEO决策视野与审计师风险决策——基于内部薪酬激励与外部研发投入双视角

企业纳税遵从、CEO决策视野与审计师风险决策——基于内部薪酬激励与外部研发投入双视角

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以2013-2023年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证考察企业纳税遵从、CEO决策视野与审计师风险决策的关系.研究发现:企业纳税遵从与审计师风险决策呈显著负相关.该结论在经过工具变量法、倾向得分匹配法以及替换核心变量等一系列稳健性检验后依旧不变,表明企业纳税遵从表现越好,审计师出具风险决策的可能性越低.机制分析表明,以薪酬激励和研发投入比衡量的CEO决策视野有助于强化企业纳税遵从对审计师风险决策的缓解作用.此外,企业纳税遵从对审计师风险决策的负向关系在成熟期、衰退期、高内部控制组表现得相对明显.研究不仅丰富了企业纳税遵从的经济后果,而且能够为企业缓解审计师风险感知提供一定的经验证据.
Corporate Tax Compliance,CEO's Decision Horizons and Auditors'Risky Decisions:Based on the Dual Perspective of Internal Compensation Incentives and External R&D Investment
Taking the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2013 to 2023 as samples,this paper empir-ically examines the relationship between corporate tax compliance,CEO's decision horizons and auditor risk decision.The study finds that there is a significant negative correlation between corporate tax compliance and auditor risk decision.This conclusion remains unchanged after a series of robustness tests such as instrumental variable method,propensity score matching and replace core variables,indicating that the better the corporate tax compliance performance,the lower the possibility of auditors making risk decisions.The mechanism analysis shows that the CEO's decision horizons measured by salary incentive and R&D investment ratio helps to strengthen the mitigating effect of corporate tax compliance on auditor risk decision.In addition,the negative relationship between corporate tax compliance and auditor risk decision is relatively obvious in the mature stage,decline stage and high internal control group.The research conclusions of this paper not only enrich the economic consequences of corporate tax compliance,but also can provide some empirical evidence for enterprises to alleviate auditor risk perception.

Corporate tax complianceAuditors'risky decisionsCEO's decision horizonsLife cycleInternal control

李茹霞

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西安财经大学商学院,陕西西安 710100

企业纳税遵从 审计师风险决策 CEO决策视野 生命周期 内部控制

2025

技术经济与管理研究
山西省人民政府发展研究中心

技术经济与管理研究

北大核心
影响因子:0.733
ISSN:1004-292X
年,卷(期):2025.(1)