Supply Chain Decisions Considering Supplier Loss Aversion and Financial Constraints
With increasingly competitive markets,it is particularly common for suppliers to be underfunded in the presence of yield uncertainty.Based on this,a Stackelberg game model is constructed with the lead of risk-neutral manufacturer and the follo-wer of loss-averse supplier.The optimal production input quantity decision of the loss-averse supplier and the optimal loss-sha-ring decision of the manufacturer are given under the two modes of bank financing and manufacturer's advance payment finan-cing,respectively.The theoretical and numerical analyses show that,when each parameter takes different values within a certain range,the supplier and the manufacturer may tend to choose different financing modes;in the advance payment financing mode,the more loss-averse the supplier is,the more conservative production strategy she will adopt,and then the manufacturer will in-centivize the supplier to increase the amount of production inputs by assuming more loss-sharing ratios.
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