Optimal Copyright Protection Decisions for the Digital Product Supply Chain
With the advancement of Internet technology and the popularity of digital products,the digital industry has devel-oped rapidly,while the digital piracy problem has become more and more serious.Aiming at the piracy problem in the digital prod-uct market,a supply chain model of a single supplier and a single retailer is constructed,and the optimal copyright protection deci-sion of the supplier as the game leader is studied.It is studied that when the level of government enforcement is low,supplier needs to set a higher level of copyright protection to limit piracy,and the level of copyright protection has a substitute relationship with the level of government enforcement.Meanwhile,the threat of direct competition or shadow competition of piracy can partially alleviate the double marginalization between supplier and retailer,so that both supplier and retailer can achieve a win-win situation.Howev-er,when the level of government enforcement is high,the supplier will directly choose the zero-copyright protection strategy and benefit from it,which will damage the interests of retailer.At this time,there is no substitute relationship between the level of copy-right protection and the level of government enforcement.
digital piracysupply chaincopyright protectiongovernment enforcement
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