Evolutionary Game Analysis on the "Risk-Taking Behaviors" in Mine Production
Risk-taking behaviours in mining production is one of the unsafety behaviours impacting the safety status of mine enterprises more seriously.In order to study the occurring causes of the risk-taking behaviours and their corresponding control strategy,an evolutionary game model of workers and safety regulators was constructed,and the game process was ana-lyzed by system dynamics method.The results show that:① The costs and benefits of workers'safety behavior and safety regu-lator's supervision behavior are the major causes affecting the occurrence of"risk-taking behaviours"in mines;② The intensi-ty of mine supervision affects the probability of workers'unsafe behavior,and the intensity of mine supervision is positively cor-related with the safety probability of worker behavior within a certain range;③ Increasing the economic punishment of safety regulators on unstable workers and increasing the risk cost borne by unstable workers can improve the safety production of en-terprises in a short period of time;④ The benefits of workers in the behavioral safety state have the greatest impact on the regu-latory behavior of workers'behavioral safety and safety regulators.Enterprises can formulate corresponding safety control strate-gies according to the dynamic game evolution process and the influence degree of model parameters.
risk-taking behaviours in productionevolutionary game modelsystem dynamicssafety control strategy
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