首页|需求风险下污水处理PPP项目调价方式研究

需求风险下污水处理PPP项目调价方式研究

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污水处理PPP项目所惯用的保底机制常常被认为会给政府造成隐性债务,审计时要求整改,当实际污水处理需求量低于基本水量时,政府如何合理支付相应费用有待深入研究.以调整污水处理单价的形式取代传统的直接以基本水量乘以原单价进行结算,基于演化博弈理论构建政府和社会资本之间的博弈模型,分析双方决策的动态演化规律,求出社会资本接受和不接受调整后的污水处理单价的阈值,根据运维绩效考核系数确定最终单价,并通过案例分析验证了模型的有效性.研究表明:该调价方式能够在保证污水处理企业可持续发展的前提下使政府的财政支出更为合理,提高后续项目入库的概率,推动PPP模式高质量发展.
Research on price adjustment method of wastewater treatment PPP project under demand risk
The minimum guarantee mechanism commonly used in sewage treatment PPP projects is often considered to cause hidden debts to the government,requiring rectification during the audit.When the actual sewage treatment demand is lower than the basic water volume,how the government can reasonably pay the corresponding costs needs to be further studied.This paper takes the form of adjusting the unit price of sewage treatment instead of the traditional settlement by directly multiplying the basic water quantity by the original unit price.Based on the evolutionary game theory,a game model between the government and social capital is constructed to analyze the dynamic evolution law of the decision of both sides,and the threshold value of social capital accepting or not accepting the adjusted unit price of sewage treatment is obtained,and the final unit price is determined according to the operation and maintenance performance appraisal coefficient.The validity of the model is verified by case analysis.The re-search shows that the price adjustment method can make the government's financial expenditure more reasonable,improve the probability of subsequent projects being stored,and promote the high-quality development of the PPP model under the premise of ensuring the sustainable development of sewage treatment enterprises.

PPP projectsewage treatmentprice adjustment modeevolutionary gamedemand risk

胡志腾、张哨军

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武汉工程大学,湖北 武汉 430074

PPP项目 污水处理 调价方式 演化博弈 需求风险

2024

技术与市场
四川省科技信息研究所

技术与市场

影响因子:0.566
ISSN:1006-8554
年,卷(期):2024.31(2)
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