需求风险下污水处理PPP项目调价方式研究
Research on price adjustment method of wastewater treatment PPP project under demand risk
胡志腾 1张哨军1
作者信息
- 1. 武汉工程大学,湖北 武汉 430074
- 折叠
摘要
污水处理PPP项目所惯用的保底机制常常被认为会给政府造成隐性债务,审计时要求整改,当实际污水处理需求量低于基本水量时,政府如何合理支付相应费用有待深入研究.以调整污水处理单价的形式取代传统的直接以基本水量乘以原单价进行结算,基于演化博弈理论构建政府和社会资本之间的博弈模型,分析双方决策的动态演化规律,求出社会资本接受和不接受调整后的污水处理单价的阈值,根据运维绩效考核系数确定最终单价,并通过案例分析验证了模型的有效性.研究表明:该调价方式能够在保证污水处理企业可持续发展的前提下使政府的财政支出更为合理,提高后续项目入库的概率,推动PPP模式高质量发展.
Abstract
The minimum guarantee mechanism commonly used in sewage treatment PPP projects is often considered to cause hidden debts to the government,requiring rectification during the audit.When the actual sewage treatment demand is lower than the basic water volume,how the government can reasonably pay the corresponding costs needs to be further studied.This paper takes the form of adjusting the unit price of sewage treatment instead of the traditional settlement by directly multiplying the basic water quantity by the original unit price.Based on the evolutionary game theory,a game model between the government and social capital is constructed to analyze the dynamic evolution law of the decision of both sides,and the threshold value of social capital accepting or not accepting the adjusted unit price of sewage treatment is obtained,and the final unit price is determined according to the operation and maintenance performance appraisal coefficient.The validity of the model is verified by case analysis.The re-search shows that the price adjustment method can make the government's financial expenditure more reasonable,improve the probability of subsequent projects being stored,and promote the high-quality development of the PPP model under the premise of ensuring the sustainable development of sewage treatment enterprises.
关键词
PPP项目/污水处理/调价方式/演化博弈/需求风险Key words
PPP project/sewage treatment/price adjustment mode/evolutionary game/demand risk引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据