首页|博弈模型下小汽车尾号限行方案优化

博弈模型下小汽车尾号限行方案优化

扫码查看
为揭示不同尾号限行方案在实施过程中的效果,得到令政府和小汽车拥有者都满意的限行方案,研究基于效用函数和博弈论模型的尾号限行方案制定方法.首先,在分析政府和小汽车拥有者的动态博弈过程基础上,分别定义政府和小汽车拥有者的效用函数;然后,构建小汽车尾号限行方案的非合作动态 Stackelberg博弈模型;最后,设计基于种群多样性控制策略的遗传算法,并利用Python对所建模型编码求解.以兰州市为例进行模型验证,研究表明,优化尾号限行方案下小汽车拥有者的平均出行成本基本没变化,政府的平均社会效用值提高 1.062×107.因此,依靠理论模型制定的小汽车尾号限行方案,不仅具有充分的理论依据,还能更好发挥限行方案功效.
Optimization of car tail-number restriction scheme under game model
To reveal the effects of different tail-number restriction schemes during implementation,and to obtain a satisfactory scheme for both the government and car owners,a method for tail-number restriction scheme formulation based on utility functions and game theory models was studied.Firstly,utility functions for the government and car owners were defined separately,considering the dynamic game process.Then,a non-cooperative dynamic Stackelberg game model for car tail-number restriction schemes was constructed.Finally,a genetic algorithm with a population diversity control strategy was designed,and the model was coded and solved using python.Taking Lanzhou city as an example to verify the model,the research showed that under the optimized tail-number restriction scheme,the average travel cost for car owners remained almost the same,while the average social utility value for the government increased by 1.062×107.Therefore,the tail-number restriction scheme formulated based on the theoretical model not only has sufficient theoretical basis but also can better exert the effectiveness of the restriction scheme.

traffic engineeringcar tail-number restriction schemegenetic algorithmStackelberg gamesocial utility

刘囡、王花兰

展开 >

兰州交通大学 交通运输学院,兰州 730070

交通工程 小汽车尾号限行方案 遗传算法 斯塔克尔伯格博弈 社会效用

甘肃省重点研发计划项目甘肃省教育厅"双一流"科研重点项目

23YFFA0058GSSYLXM-04

2024

交通科技与经济
黑龙江工程学院

交通科技与经济

影响因子:0.862
ISSN:1008-5696
年,卷(期):2024.26(2)
  • 25