Supply Chain Decision-making for Construction and Demolition Waste Resource Utilization Under Reciprocal Preferences of Recyclers
To explore the decision-making of members in the supply chain of construction and demolition waste resource utilization under reciprocal preferences,a model is constructed and solved using the Stackelberg game theory approach,based on reverse supply chain theory,reciprocal preference theory,and consumer behavior theory.The impact of factors related to reciprocal preferences,and consumer low-carbon preferences on firm decisions under decentralized and centralized decision-making is analyzed.The results show that under centralized decision-making,increased low-carbon preferences of consumers reduces the recycling price of construction waste remanufacturers and recyclers,while increasing the carbon reduction level of remanufacturers.Under decentralized decision-making,when the reciprocal preference of recyclers is high,the profit of remanufacturers increases significantly,while the profit and utility of recyclers both decrease significantly.The findings provide the basis for strategy selection by members of the construction waste resource utilization supply chain.
Stackelberg gameclosed-loop supply chain for construction wastereciprocal preferencescarbon reduction levelsconsumer low-carbon preferences