Research on Optimal Cooperative Profit Allocation Mechanism of General Contracting Consortium Considering Fairness Preference
Considering the differences in bargaining power between two participants,the optimal profit allocation problem of the design and construction consortium is studied.Specifically,we construct two Nash bargaining models,in which one acts as a benchmark and the other introduces fairness preference,to determine the optimal profit allocation and effort levels of both sides and conduct the impact of fairness preference on decision and profits.The results show that:the relationship between the bargaining power and the construction unit's effort level presents an inverted"U"shaped trend,while bargaining power has a mixed impact on the design unit's effort level,which is modulated by fairness preferences and follows an inverted"U"shape or a positive correlation pattern;when the Fairness preferences also have a negative correlation,inverted"U"shape,and positive correlation effect on the effort level of the design unit;when the bargaining power of the design unit is relatively strong,an appropriate fairness preference of the construction unit can act as an incentive to increase its effort level.However,when the bargaining power of the design unit is relatively weak,the fairness preference of the construction unit may reduce its effort level.The research aims to provide reference for optimal profit allocation mechanisms in general contracting consortium to promote common creation and mutual benefits.
general contractingconsortiumNash bargainingbargaining powerfairness preference
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