Research on Cost Management and Control of Government-invested Projects Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Improving the efficiency of financial fund utilization in the management of government-invested projects represents a significant challenge.The entire process cost management contributes to the solution of this challenge.This research developed a tripartite evolutionary game model,which included the government,owner,and the whole process cost consultant.The model explored the evolution path of the tripartite dynamic game and analyzed the gradual and stable condition of the behavioral strategies of all parties.The findings of the research indicate that the government's rewards and punishments have a positive impact on encouraging the participation of the owner in project management and control.Furthermore,the owner's rewards and punishments have a significant effect on improving the service level of the whole process cost consultant.To achieve optimal strategic balance among the three parties,the government's strategy of punishment is dominant in its supervision of owners,while the strategy of reward is secondary.Similarly,the owner's strategy of incentives is dominant in its management of the whole process cost consultant,while the strategy of punishment is secondary.The results of the simulation conducted using Matlab software demonstrate the rationality of the research conclusions.
government-invested projectwhole process cost managementtripartite dynamic gameduplicative dynamic equation
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