Research on the Performance of Inherent Defects Insurance of Construction Quality Based on SD Evolutionary Game
The implementation effect of Inherent Defects Insurance(IDI),which is currently being vigorously promoted in China,requires urgent improvement.A game model of the insurance company,contractor,and risk management institution in the performance stage is constructed from the perspective of the insurance company,and a simulation is carried out using system dynamics to address project quality problems caused by rent-seeking behaviors.The values of cooperation loss,reputation loss,and supervision cost were altered to explore the evolution process of each agent's behavior and the influence of each factor on the change of the agent's strategy.The findings indicate that the active supervision of insurance companies is positively influenced by the rent-seeking strategies of contractors and the intentional rent-seeking strategies of risk management institutions.In the context of long-term cooperation,it can be observed that there will be no rent-seeking behavior,and that the supervision cost is the main factor affecting the insurance company's strategy.The verification results are based on scientific evidence and provide a theoretical foundation for the implementation and application of IDI in the market.
building constructioninherent defects insurancestakeholdermulti-subjectsevolutionary gamesystem dynamics
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