基于SD演化博弈的建筑工程质量潜在缺陷保险履约研究
Research on the Performance of Inherent Defects Insurance of Construction Quality Based on SD Evolutionary Game
薛松 1方洁 1陈静妍 2黄国华3
作者信息
- 1. 河海大学 商学院,江苏 南京 211100;河海大学 项目管理研究所,江苏 南京 211100
- 2. 河海大学 项目管理研究所,江苏 南京 211100
- 3. 河海大学 商学院,江苏 南京 211100
- 折叠
摘要
当前,我国大力推行的住宅质量潜在缺陷保险(Inherent Defects Insurance,IDI)实施效果亟需改善.针对寻租行为导致的工程质量问题,基于保险公司视角构建履约阶段保险公司、承包商、风险管理机构的三方博弈模型,运用系统动力学进行仿真,改变合作损失、名誉损失、监督成本等数值,探究各主体行为演化过程及各因素对主体策略变化的影响.结果表明,保险公司积极监督受到承包商寻租和风险管理机构意向寻租策略的正向影响,出于长久合作考虑,不会出现寻租行为,监督成本是影响保险公司策略的主要因素.验证结果具有科学性,为IDI在市场中的顺利推行和应用提供了理论依据.
Abstract
The implementation effect of Inherent Defects Insurance(IDI),which is currently being vigorously promoted in China,requires urgent improvement.A game model of the insurance company,contractor,and risk management institution in the performance stage is constructed from the perspective of the insurance company,and a simulation is carried out using system dynamics to address project quality problems caused by rent-seeking behaviors.The values of cooperation loss,reputation loss,and supervision cost were altered to explore the evolution process of each agent's behavior and the influence of each factor on the change of the agent's strategy.The findings indicate that the active supervision of insurance companies is positively influenced by the rent-seeking strategies of contractors and the intentional rent-seeking strategies of risk management institutions.In the context of long-term cooperation,it can be observed that there will be no rent-seeking behavior,and that the supervision cost is the main factor affecting the insurance company's strategy.The verification results are based on scientific evidence and provide a theoretical foundation for the implementation and application of IDI in the market.
关键词
房屋建筑/工程质量潜在缺陷保险/利益相关者/多元主体/演化博弈/系统动力学Key words
building construction/inherent defects insurance/stakeholder/multi-subjects/evolutionary game/system dynamics引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJL023)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2019B19614)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据