碳交易政策下低碳建筑利益相关者演化博弈分析
Evolution Game Analysis of Stakeholders of Low-carbon Buildings Under Carbon Trading Policy
韦海民 1代章豹1
作者信息
- 1. 西安建筑科技大学 管理学院,陕西 西安 710311
- 折叠
摘要
低碳建筑有助于推进建筑业低碳转型,促进低碳社会建设,实现我国"双碳"战略目标.为推动低碳建筑的发展,从碳交易视角出发,构建了以政府、消费者及开发商为利益主体的三方演化博弈模型,并借助 Matlab 数值仿真了各主体在不同条件下的演化稳定策略.结果表明:碳交易政策有助于低碳建筑市场的发展;在碳交易政策下,政府能以较低的奖惩措施影响开发商和消费者的策略选择;与开发商相比,消费者对有关经济激励及碳交易政策更加敏感,政府应该更加重视消费者在低碳建筑市场中的作用.
Abstract
Low-carbon buildings facilitate the transformation towards a low-carbon construction industry,contribute to the development of a low-carbon society,and support China's'double carbon'strategic goal.To promote low-carbon buildings,this paper develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government,consumers,and developers as stakeholders.It explores the evolutionary stability strategies of each party under varying conditions using Matlab,from the perspective of carbon trading.The results show that:the carbon trading policy is conducive to the development of a low-carbon building market;Under the carbon trading policy,the government can influence the strategy choices of developers and consumers with lower incentives and punishments.Compared with developers,consumers are more sensitive to economic incentives and carbon trading policies,and the government should pay more attention to the role of consumers in the low-carbon construction market.
关键词
低碳建筑/碳交易政策/演化博弈/利益相关者Key words
low-carbon building/carbon trading policy/evolution game/stakeholder引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据