基于委托代理模型的EPC项目多任务激励机制实践
Practice of Multi-task Incentive Mechanism of EPC Project Based on Principal Agent Model
孙春玲 1刘春丽 1吴绍艳 1邓斌超1
作者信息
- 1. 天津理工大学 管理学院,天津 300384
- 折叠
摘要
EPC 项目中总承包商与分包商之间存在长期合作的可能性,而并非一般委托代理的一次性合作关系,激励机制的设置可以促使双方成为利益共同体,共同致力于项目绩效的提升.结合工程项目特点通过委托代理理论建立多任务激励模型,从而得到最优激励系数,结果表明激励系数受风险规避程度、努力成本系数、外界不确定性系数影响,根据结果对激励机制如何在现实中实施提出建议;通过具体案例讨论不同激励系数下总承包商和分包商的收益情况,论证了激励机制的可行性.在最优激励强度下双方可达到共赢,并达成长久的稳定合作关系.
Abstract
In EPC projects,there is a possibility of long-term cooperation between the general contractor and subcontractors,rather than the general principal-agent one-time cooperative relationship,the incentive mechanism can be set up to promote both parties to become a community of interest,and jointly committed to the improvement of project performance.Combined with the characteristics of the project through the principal-agent theory to establish a multi-task incentive model,so as to obtain the optimal incentive coefficient,the results show that the incentive coefficient is affected by the degree of risk aversion,the effort cost coefficient,the external uncertainty coefficient;and based on the results,make recommendations on how to implement the incentive mechanism in reality;Finally,through the specific case of discussing different incentive coefficients under the benefit of the general contractor and subcontractors,demonstrating the feasibility of the incentive mechanism.Under the optimal incentive strength,both parties can achieve a win-win situation and reach a long-term stable cooperative relationship.
关键词
委托代理/EPC项目/多任务/激励机制Key words
principal agent/EPC project/multi-task/incentive mechanism引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据