Evolutionary Game Analysis between No-Grazing Herders'Illegal Grazing and Local Government Regulation under the Policy of Returning Grazing Land to Grassland
No-grazing herders'illegal grazing hinders the sustainable development of the Returning Grazing Land to Grassland Project.Dynamic game analysis between illegal grazing and local government regulation provides a quantitative understanding of the cost-benefit boundaries of both parties'behaviours,which helps to formulate reasonable and effective regulatory countermeasures.Starting from the payoff functions of micro subjects,this study constructed an evolutionary game model between local government regulation and no-grazing herders'illegal grazing.The behavioral evolution rules and stability strategies of participants were analyzed according to the replication dynamic equation,and the influencing factors of effective grassland management were discussed by using Python simulation tools.The study found that:(1)Under certain conditions,the dynamic equilibrium between local government supervision and non-illegal grazing could be achieved.(2)Enhancing penalties for illegal grazing,providing more project subsidies,increasing the pressure on local governments to enforce regulations,and increasing no-grazing herders'income from other industries could effectively reduce illegal grazing.(3)Increased regulatory costs can delay equilibrium.(4)Increased benefits of illegal grazing extend herders'time to reach equilibrium but shorten the government's.Based on these findings,this study proposed to increase penalties,optimize subsidy policies,improve monitoring mechanisms,and provide employment training to provide a scientific basis for formulating countermeasures to curb illegal grazing,promoting the coordinated development of ecological protection and people's well-being.
evolutionary gameillegal grazingreturn grazing land to grasslandgovernment behaviorgrassland degradation
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
