Resolution of the Trust Crisis of Copyright Collective Management from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game
Copyright collective management has always been regarded by most countries in the world as an important way to solve the difficulty of safeguarding rights and obtaining rights in the case of numerous and scattered copyright owners and users.However,the trust crisis among copyright owners,collective management organizations and users has always affected the effective operation of the system.By using evolutionary game theory to establish the payment matrix of copyright collective management operation,the decision evolution and influencing factors of copyright owners,collective management organizations and users in copyright collective management is systematically analyzed.It is found that the stability of the system evolution strategy is directly related to the cost-benefit of copyright owners,collective management organizations and users.The change of the initial willingness of the copyright owner and the collective management organization will affect the final strategy choice of the group.The final strategy choice of the user is not affected by the initial willingness of the other two parties,but the final stable evolution speed of the user will be affected.Therefore,it is necessary to reduce the cost of collective management of copyright,encourage copyright owners to adopt the'licensing'strategy,collective management organizations to adopt the'effort'strategy,and users to adopt the'authorized use'strategy.
万方数据
维普
