创新联合体主体融通创新激励机制研究
Research on Innovation Incentive Mechanism of Main Body Integration of Innovation Consortium
支含年 1吴洁 1盛永祥 1谢颖1
作者信息
- 1. 江苏科技大学经济管理学院, 江苏镇江 212003
- 折叠
摘要
面对日趋严峻且复杂多变的国际竞争形势,高效促进创新联合体主体融通创新进而加强关键核心技术攻关至关重要.借鉴量子博弈思想从知识流动的畅通度和创新链与产业链的融合度两个角度研究创新联合体主体融通创新的激励机制.构建创新联合体主体融通创新的二元连续策略集博弈模型,对比研究不同情形下畅通度和融合度对创新联合体主体融通创新的影响,得到利于创新联合体主体融通创新的最佳融通状态,并据此设计有效的激励机制,提出"融通合同"在一定程度上抑制了"搭便车"行为的发生,降低了融通创新的风险,激励创新联合体主体实现产业核心技术的突破.
Abstract
Facing the increasingly severe and complex international competition situation,it is of great importance to effectively promote the integration and innovation of innovation consortia and strengthen the research on key core technologies.Based on the quantum game theory,this paper studies the incentive mechanism of integrated innovation from two perspectives:the unimpeded degree of knowledge flow and the integration degree of innovation chain and industrial chain.A binary continuous strategy set game model for the integration of entities of innovation consortia is constructed,and the influence of smoothness and integration on the integration of entities of innova-tion consortia under different circumstances is compared.The optimal state of integration conducive to the integration of entities of inno-vation consortia is obtained,and an effective incentive mechanism is designed accordingly.It is proposed that the"accommodation con-tract"can restrain the free-rider behavior to some extent,reduce the risk of accommodation innovation,and encourage the main body of innovation consortium to achieve the breakthrough of industrial core technology.
关键词
创新联合体/融通创新/融通合同/激励机制Key words
innovation consortium/integrated innovation/accommodation contract/incentive mechanism引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(19FGLB029)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据