Risk Preferences of Executive Team,Internal Control and Corporate Financialization
The risk preferences of the executive team,internal control and corporate financialization are the important basic theory for researching and improving the pragmatic route of enterprises and improving the efficiency of corporate resource allocation.It is also an important reference basis for optimizing executive teams and formulating internal control systems in actual enterprise management.Studies are based on the samples of financial data from 2008 to 2019 of listed company of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares,which are also the data base for building up the evaluation index system to inspect the relationship between the risk preferences of executive team,the corporate internal control and corporate asset financialization.By the research,it can be found that the risk preferences of the executive team suppress the corporate financialization behavior;the higher the quality of the internal control of the enterprise,the more the asset financialization is suppressed;in addition,the research has also found that the risk preferences of executive team would significantly suppress long-term financial assets investments compared with short-term ones;in terms of mechanism,executive team risk preferences can suppress corporate financialization by reinforcing corporate research and development investments.The theoretical significance of the article is to enrich the economic consequences of the risk preferences of executive team and to deepen the research of the influencing factors of corporate financialization;the practical significance of the article is to optimize investment efficiency of executive team,to formulate internal control system,and to improve the efficiency of corporate resource allocation efficiency.It has a certain reference value for promoting the transformation and upgrading of the real economy and promoting the economy to remove from deficiency and move toward reality.
万方数据
维普
