业绩承诺变更会影响企业研发费用操纵吗?
Does Performance Commitment Change Affect R&D Manipulation?
金宇 1唐梦航 2高萌萌3
作者信息
- 1. 天津财经大学会计学院
- 2. 东北大学工商管理学院
- 3. 天津市中赢新材料科技有限公司
- 折叠
摘要
以2011-2022年A股并购业绩承诺事件为研究对象,探讨了业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响.研究发现:业绩承诺变更加剧了上市公司研发费用操纵现象,且这一影响是通过激发高管机会主义、降低商业信用融资能力实现的;异质性检验发现,业绩承诺变更对研发费用操纵的影响在关联并购事件、主并方为国有企业、以及分析师关注程度较低的企业中更为显著;动机和经济后果检验发现,业绩承诺变更主要通过激发高管的政策迎合动机提高了研发费用操纵水平,而该行为使得企业获取了更多的税收优惠和政府补助.
Abstract
Taking the A-share M&A performance commitment events from 2011 to 2022 as the research object,This paper examines the impact of performance commitment changes on the R&D manipulation.The study finds that changes in performance promises increase firms'R&D manipulation and that this effect is achieved by increasing executive opportunism and reducing commercial credit financing;The heterogeneity test finds that the effect of performance commitment change on R&D manipulation is more significant among firms with connected M&A events,state-owned firms,and firms with less analyst attention;Motivation and economic consequences tests find that performance commitment changes increase R&D manipulation more by motivating executives'policy pandering motives,and that the behavior does allow firms to obtain more tax incentives and government grants.
关键词
业绩承诺变更/研发费用操纵/机会主义/商业信用融资Key words
performance commitment change/R&D manipulation/opportunism/commercial credit financing引用本文复制引用
基金项目
天津市社会科学基金青年项目(TJGLQN22-003)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据