非国有股东超额委派董事与国有企业数字化转型
Excessively Appointed Director by Non-state-owned Shareholder and Digital Transformation of State-owned Enterprise
杨海燕 1闭宇慧1
作者信息
摘要
文章基于2008-2021年A股国有上市公司数据,探究非国有股东超额委派董事对国有企业数字化转型的影响.研究发现:非国有股东超额委派董事能够显著提升国企数字化转型水平,且主要通过增强创新能力、促进股权激励与缓解融资约束三条路径来实现;异质性检验表明,上述关系在地方性国企、竞争性行业以及分析师关注程度较高的国企中更为显著;扩展性分析发现,当非国有股东超额委派董事时国有企业数字化转型的价值创造效应凸显.文章丰富了非国有股东治理的研究,同时为国企提高数字化水平、实现高质量发展提供理论依据.
Abstract
Based on the data of a-share State-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2021,this paper explores the impact of Non-state-owned shareholders over-appointing directors on the digital transformation of State-owned enterprises.The findings are as follows:Non-state-owned shareholders'over-appointment of directors can significantly improve the State-owned enterprises'digital transformation level,and it can be achieved by strengthening innovation ability,promoting equity incentive and easing financing constraints;Heterogeneity test shows that the above-mentioned relationship is more significant in local soes,competitive industries and soes with high attention in capital market;The expansion analysis shows that when Non-state-owned shareholders over-appoint directors,the value-creation effect of State-owned enterprises'digital transformation is prominent.The article enriches the research category of Non-state-owned shareholder governance,and provides a theoretical basis for State-owned enterprises to improve the level of digitization and achieve higher quality development.
关键词
非国有股东/超额委派董事/国有企业数字化转型Key words
non-state shareholders/excessively appointed director/digital transformation of state-owned enterprise引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据