The Pressure Downshift of Gains Handover and Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions:Evi-dence from Central Listed Companies
As a mandatory dividend policy,the pressure to contribute to the earnings of state-owned capital is shifted to the lower subsidiaries within the group along with the control hierarchy of the enterprise.The paper takes the implementation of the state capital gains handover policy as an exogenous shock and uses a multi-period DID model to examine the impact of downshift pressure of gains handover on the initiation and performance of the M&A of central listed enterprises.The study finds that the implementation of the capital gains handover policy significantly reduces the number of M&A initiations of central listed enterprises,and at the same time improves the M&A performance,which is characterized by"fewer but better"M&A.Mechanism test shows that this policy affects M&A through reducing administrative intervention and suppressing management self-interest.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that non-state shareholder governance has a substitution effect on the impact of the earnings surrender policy on M&A,while corporate ESG performance has a reinforcing effect on the policy's impact.This paper not only reveals the microeconomic effect of the implementation of the policy of surrendering state-owned capital gains from the perspective of M&A,but also provides a realistic basis for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises through M&A.
gains handoverM&Acentral enterprisesenterprise groups
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