Research on the Dilemma of Urban Investment Bonds under Multiple Game Scenarios
Urban investment bonds have played a positive role in promoting the rapid development of Chinese cities,but the risk of some debts being difficult to repay has also raised many concerns.This article is based on debt data,interview materials,and general administrative documents obtained from in-depth research on L city,combined with game analysis methods,to deeply analyze the difficulties and reasons for the operation of its urban investment bonds.Research has found that there are two levels of complex game relationships between different stakeholders in the process of borrowing,using,and converting debt for local governments:the first level is based on the local government as the stakeholder and unfolds between the central local financial institutions,while the second level is based on the local government as the platform and unfolds between the local government's urban investment platform,local government functional departments,and lower level county and district governments.In these two levels of game,different subjects have their own interests,driving mechanisms,and strategic choices,thus forming the dilemma of urban investment bonds.Based on this,it is suggested to start from the perspective of institutional innovation,especially from the innovation of local financial system,industrial development incentive mechanism,party organization coordination and supervision mechanism,to solve the multiple game dilemma of urban investment and debt,and to promote local economic development to a new stage.
central local relationsfiscal decentralizationurban investment bondsurban investment company
万方数据
维普
