首页|超越物理主义:从罗素一元论看僵尸论证

超越物理主义:从罗素一元论看僵尸论证

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物理主义者和二元论者围绕"意识能不能被物理地解释"争论已久.查尔莫斯提出僵尸论证有力反驳了物理主义,在近二十余年的争论中占据重要位置.在回溯查尔莫斯对克里普克思想的继承、梳理僵尸论证的步骤后,可以总结出反驳僵尸论证的两条不同思路:要么质疑僵尸论证的具体步骤的可靠性;要么着眼论证中所提出的罗素一元论,认为罗素一元论不仅不构成对物理主义的反驳,还能推出罗素式物理主义.前者忽略了僵尸论证的核心概念:罗素一元论,不能成立.只有沿着后者,才能触及该论证的核心问题:何谓物理主义?物理主义和罗素一元论的关系是什么?如果想让关于僵尸论证的讨论焕发新的生机,必须关注后一条反驳思路.
Beyond Physicalism:The Zombie Argument from the Perspective of Russellian Monism
Physicalists and dualists have long debated whether consciousness can be explained physically.Chalmers'zombie argument powerfully refutes physicalism and has held a significant position in the debate over the past two decades.By tracing Chalmers'inheritance of Kripke's ideas and outlining the steps of the zombie argument,two different approaches to refuting the zombie argument can be summa-rized:either questioning the reliability of the specific steps of the zombie argument or focusing on the Rus-sellian monism presented in the argument.The latter approach suggests that Russellian monism not only fails to refute physicalism but also leads to a form of Russellian physicalism.The former approach is unsuccessful and overlooks the core concept of the zombie argument:Russellian monism.Only by follow-ing the latter approach can the core issues of the argument be addressed:What is physicalism?What is the relationship between physicalism and Russellian monism?To revitalize the discussion about the zombie argument,attention must be paid to this latter line of refutation.

Chalmerszombie argumentphysicalismRussellian monismconsciousness

赵海若

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中国人民大学哲学院

查尔莫斯 僵尸论证 物理主义 罗素一元论 意识

2024

科学·经济·社会
兰州大学

科学·经济·社会

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.229
ISSN:1006-2815
年,卷(期):2024.42(5)