Evolutionary Game Research on Supervision Strategy of Short Video Platform Under Static and Graded Punishment Mechanism
In order to solve the regulatory dilemma of the short-video market and build an effective regulatory mechanism for short-video platforms,this study constructs an evolutionary game model for short-video platforms and users under the government's static punishment mechanism and graded punishment mechanism respectively based on evolutionary game theory,and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary path and interaction mechanism of their behavioral decisions.The research shows that under the static punishment mechanism,short video platforms tend to choose the strategy of"strict regulation"when the government punishment or the loss of platform reputation gradually increases,but as the cost of regulation and the cost of users increases,short video platforms then turn to choose the strategy of"negative regulation".However,as the cost of regulation and the cost to lost users increases,short video platforms then move to a"negative regulation"strategy.Users'strategy choice depends on both platform penalties and government penalties,with users choosing a"compliance"strategy when and only when both platform penalties and government penalties are higher.Under a graded penalty mechanism,increasing the strength of primary and secondary penalties will also lead platforms to choose a"strict regulation"strategy.The probability of strict regulation on short-video platforms decreases as the probability of user compliance increases under a graded penalty mechanism,as opposed to a static penalty mechanism.More importantly,short-video platforms will always choose a"strict regulation"strategy under a graded penalty mechanism as opposed to a static penalty mechanism.
short videoplatform supervisionhierarchical punishment mechanismevolutionary game
万方数据
维普
