To effectively promote the innovation-driven high-quality development,it is necessary to explore how to overcome the formal and strategic limitations of technological innovation and construct a driving mechanism for high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of executive incentives.Based on the framework of principal-agent theory,this study uti-lized the data from A-share state-owned listed companies to examine the influence and mechanism of executive reputation on high-quality innovation of state-owned enterprises from multiple dimensions.The results demonstrated that executive reputation pro-motes the high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises effectively.The mechanism test showed that executive reputation drives the high-quality innovation by providing incentive compensation,enhancing principal-agent efficiency,and improving the level of executive risk-taking.The heterogeneity test revealed that contextual factors such as characteristics of high-tech industries and degree of marketization strengthen the positive effect of executive reputation on the high-quality innovation in state-owned en-terprises.This paper has verified the effective contract hypothesis of executive reputation from the perspective of high-quality in-novation,expanded the application boundaries of principal-agent theory,and will provide a new theoretical perspective and prac-tical pathway for the innovation management of state-owned enterprises.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
