Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and improving their competitiveness is an important part of China's reform of current economic systems.We used the annual data of A-share listed enterprises in China from 2003 to 2011 and 2014 to 2021,and adopted the method of difference in difference to analyze the difference between the prudential and flexible supervision of state-owned equity on the innovation of SOEs.We found that more flexible regulation has a more positive incentive effect on SOES'innovation after the reform of state-owned equity regulation.The mechanisms are that more flexible supervision improves the equity structure and board governance,reduces agency costs,and improves financial redundancy.By means of the heterogeneity test,we found that more flexible supervision has a more significant impact on technology-leading enterprises,firms in non-regulatory industries,and central SOEs.In addition,the more flexible regulation also significantly promotes the reform of mixed ownership and improves the breakthrough innovation and the innovation quality of SOEs.Ultimately,it improves firms'value,profitability and resource allocation efficiency.This paper will provide some micro evidence for the institutional dividend of the reform direction of administration reform of state-owned equity supervision and provide important policy enlightenment for deepening the reform of SOEs and promoting the high-quality development of the real economy.
supervision and reform of state-owned equityinnovation of state-owned enterprisescorporate governance
维普
万方数据
