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多主体参与的创新联合体稳定策略研究

Research on the stable strategy of innovation consortium with multi-agent participation

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创新联合体作为新型举国体制微观化成果,成为我国应对科技创新发展形势、构建融通创新体系和支撑产业高质量发展的重要载体.本研究基于创新联合体多主体参与模型,考虑在中央政府考核监管和公共研究组织知识创造作用下的产业链领军企业、产业链配套企业和地方政府的策略选择,构建三方演化博弈模型,求解不同情况下的演化稳定策略组合,利用李雅普诺夫第一法则分析了演化策略组合的稳定性,并运用Matlab 2022b对博弈主体在不同参量变化下的策略选择进行了仿真分析.研究结果表明:(1)产业链领军企业是影响创新联合体组建的关键内驱力,对于产业链领军企业而言,不主导创新时的招致损失和协同创新成本是影响其演化博弈结果的关键因素;(2)产业链配套企业作为创新联合体体系化创新力量,对地方政府补贴敏感度高于产业链领军企业,当产业链领军企业主导创新和地方政府补贴的概率越高,产业链配套企业越倾向加入创新联合体;(3)地方政府的支持是创新联合体前期组建的基础引领动力,中央政府对地方政府的资金倾斜力度会对地方政府演化稳定策略产生显著积极影响.最后,本文提出如下对策建议:提供精细化政策保障,增强产业链领军企业主导创新能力;实施针对性补贴支持,激发产业链配套企业内生创新动力;搭建融通合作平台,增强产业链创新活力.通过将创新联合体的关键参与主体及其相应功能定位和主体策略选择演化过程作为研究主线,进一步丰富了组建创新联合体的理论研究,系统聚焦创新联合体微观主体的策略,为创新联合体的稳定运行提供实践启示.
Innovation consortium,representing a micro-level achievement of the new national system,has become a crucial way for China to respond to scientific and technological innovations,promote the integrated innovation and support high-quality indus-trial development.This paper,based on the multi-agent participation model of innovation consortium,after considering the stra-tegic choices of leading enterprises,supporting enterprises,and government supervision departments,constructed a tripartite evo-lutionary game model,and solved the stable equilibrium point of each game player's strategic choice.The stability of the strategy combination was analyzed with the Lyapunov's first method,and Matlab 2022b was used for simulation analysis to verify the in-fluence of each decision variable on the strategy choice of different players.The results showed that:first of all,the leading en-terprises in the industrial chain are the key driving forces affecting the formation of innovation consortium.For the leading enter-prises,the incurred loss and cost of collaborative innovation when they do not lead innovation in the innovation consortium are the key factors influencing the evolutionary game results.Secondly,the supporting enterprises in the industrial chain,as the systemic innovation subjects of innovation consortium,are more sensitive to government subsidies than the leading enterprises.With the higher probability of local government subsidies and the leading enterprises of leading innovation,they are more inclined to join the cooperation of innovation consortium.Moreover,the support of local government is the basic guiding force for the formation of innovation consortia in the early stage,and the central government's funding preference for local governments will have a positive impact on the evolution stable strategy of local governments.Finally,this paper proposed the following countermeasures:refined policies should be provided to enhance the leading innovation capabilities of the industrial chain leading enterprises;targeted sub-sidy should be implemented to stimulate the endogenous innovation drive of the industrial chain supporting enterprises;and inte-grated cooperation platforms should be established to bolster the innovation vitality of the industrial chain.Key participating enti-ties of the innovation consortium and their corresponding functional orientations,as well as the evolutionary process of their strate-gic choices should be taken as the main research line to enrich the theoretical research on the formation of innovation consortia.Moreover,focuses systematically on the strategies of micro-entities in the innovation consortium will offer more practical insights into the maintenance of stability.

innovation consortiumstable strategyleading enterprisethree-party evolutionary gamesimulation analysis

马宗国、蒋依晓

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广东财经大学 工商管理学院,广东 广州 510320

山东师范大学 商学院,山东济南 250358

创新联合体 稳定策略 领军企业 三方演化博弈 仿真分析

国家社会科学基金重点项目国家社会科学基金重点项目

21AGL0352021.09-2024.12

2024

科研管理
中国科学学与科技政策研究会联合会和清华大学技术创新研究中心

科研管理

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:2.198
ISSN:1000-2995
年,卷(期):2024.45(10)