考虑追责机制的复杂武器装备交付链式多任务激励模型
A chain multi-task incentive model for complex weapon equipment delivery based on accountability mechanism
张叶卉 1朱建军1
作者信息
- 1. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京 2111061
- 折叠
摘要
复杂武器装备的交付效率直接影响国防战斗力的转化,为提高交付效率,基于复杂武器装备交付问题处理的多任务特点,建立考虑追责机制的交付链式激励契约模型,探究在信息对称和信息不对称两种情况下追责机制、公平偏好、风险类型、依赖等因素对激励契约的影响.研究表明:公平偏好因素对各技术业务部门的努力水平有明显激励作用;代理人在相对重要且成本系数低的交付任务上投入了更多的努力;部门的综合技术水平、依赖系数、公平偏好对最优激励契约的影响与其风险偏好类型以及风险偏好程度相关;追责机制在一定程度上能够提高整体努力水平和收益分成比例,但是过高的追责能力水平反而会降低交付积极性.研究结论可为复杂装备交付环节激励契约设计提供理论支撑和依据.
Abstract
The delivery efficiency of complex weapon equipment directly affects the transformation of national defense combat effectiveness.In order to improve the delivery efficiency,based on the multi-task characteristics of the complex weapon equipment delivery problem,we establish the delivery chain incentive contract model under accountability mechanism to explore the impact of accountability mechanism,equity,risk,dependence and other factors on incentive contract under information asymmetry and information asymmetry.It shows that fair factors have obvious incentive effects on the departments'effort level and the agents invest more efforts on relatively important and low-cost tasks.The comprehensive technical level,the fair preferences,the dependency coefficient have an impact on the optimal incentive contract,and the optimal incentive contract is affected by its risk type and degree.The accountability mechanisms can improve the overall effort level and the proportion of the income in certain conditions.The research conclusion can provide theoretical support for complex weapon equipment delivery.
关键词
复杂武器装备/多任务/交付/委托代理/激励契约/追责机制Key words
complex weapon equipment/multi-task/delivery/principal-agent/incentive contract/accountability mechanisms引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据