A reverse combinatorial auction mechanism for transaction of emergency material purchase and reserve services
The establishment of a market-oriented government-enterprise joint reserve mode has become an important way to construct the emergency material reserve system.Based on this,this paper focuses on the transaction of emergency material procurement and reserve services,and designs a reverse combinatorial auction mechanism.In this auction mechanism,the government is the buyer and client of the auction,while enterprises are sellers and bidders of the auction.The auction commodities are the emergency material procurement and reserve services.First of all,this paper establishes a relationship between the government's decision-making and the enterprises'bidding behaviors through a newsvendor model,and proposes the enterprises'bidding strategies.Then,the winner determination principle(WDP)model is established to minimize the supply-demand deviation and maximize the supply quantity.Finally,a numerical example corresponding to the practice is proposed to simulate and verify the auction model.The research shows that the auction mechanism proposed not only has economic efficiency,but also can promote the government and several enterprises to reach a one-time cooperation for many periods.It can be seen that the utilization of auction mechanism to solve the practical problems faced by the government-enterprise joint reserve mode has theoretical applicability and practical advantages.
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